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Dimensions of Innovationism 
Katja Valaskivi 
Somewhere  in  some activity  or  condition  lies  a  fullness  and  richness.  In  that  
place (activity or condition) life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, 
more admirable, more what it should be.1 
 
Innovation is a contemporary buzzword, used in a great number of situations. 
The concept has been circulated from economics to the media, and is used in contexts 
ranging from national competitiveness strategies to R&D. It appears in business 
prospectuses and academic textbooks, strategy documents and funding applications, 
and local industry policy statements and guidelines for cultural enhancement. In each 
context the concept gains new meanings—gradually becoming almost a blanket term, 
all-encompassing and inevitable in discussions about the future, science, society, 
education, development, the economy, and so on. Thus, when one listens to 
politicians, consultants, academics, and journalists, it can appear that purely through 
innovations one can achieve a life that is fuller, richer, deeper, and more worthwhile. 
In this way innovations appear to form a whole worldview or belief system. I refer to 
this belief system as innovationism.  
 According to Beyer, a central structural feature of secularized societies is the 
differentiation of institutional subsystems, such as culture, politics, and the economy. 
These subsystems are relatively independent of religious norms, values, and 
justifications, and thus we are led into a situation in which the religious area of 
operations continually becomes narrower.2 However,  in  order  to  understand  the  role  
of the religious in the contemporary world, it will be necessary to widen the 
perspective. The way in which I wish to discuss the post-secular is connected to the 
ways in which the religious domain is present in subsystems that might appear to be 
secular.  The  apparent  invisibility  of  an  explicitly  religious  domain  in  a  subsystem  
does not imply an absence of aspects, dimensions, or patterns of action that function 
in  religious  ways.  Thus,  in  this  chapter  I  shall  attempt  to  identify  how,  in  this  faith  
called innovationism, practices of faith with religious implications have developed 
within frames that are not perceived as religious at all—or could even be perceived as 
totally opposed to religion.  
 One of the main propositions of the post-secularity debate states that because 
of  the  growing  public  visibility  of  religion  and  religious  phenomena,  theories  of  
secularization are no longer able to explain social conditions in contemporary 
developed societies. However, in this chapter I wish to look beyond the conventional 
definitions of religion. Given the pervasiveness of innovationism, it is imperative to 
understand  the  ways  in  which  it  communicates  a  belief  system that  manages  power,  
flows of funding, and social relationships.3 
 In  discussions  of  secularity  and  the  post-secular  society,  the  question  of  a  
search for meaning appears frequently. Charles Taylor acknowledges that even in 
societies  that  have  rid  themselves  of  God  there  is  nevertheless  an  aspiration  for  
something better: the issue is an example of what Habermas4 describes as “an 
awareness of what is missing.” Taylor5 borrows Luc Ferry’s concept of the “meaning 
of meaning” (“sens du sens”) in explicating the notion that “somewhere there is a 
fullness or richness which transcends the ordinary.” In this sense, the question indeed 
concerns “meaning of life.” Why are we here? What is the purpose of all this? The 
question of (collective) meaning is intertwined with feelings of insecurity and a desire 
for security in (globalized) times. 
 In this chapter I shall describe the dimensions6 of innovationism and the ways 
in which it is used in a collective search for meaning, or quest for certainty, in three 
national settings, the United States, Finland, and Japan. The research has been 
conducted via a combination of content analysis and discourse analysis7; it involves 
interviews with journalists and innovation systems specialists8 in the three countries, 
focusing particularly on two countries, Finland and Japan.  
 It is obvious that innovationism could be analyzed in numerous ways, for 
instance, as a hegemonic ideology. In this chapter, however, innovationism (based on 
the interviews I conducted) is perceived as a rationalized symbolic universe with 
religious features. Thus, what I wish to do here is to test the conceptualization of 
innovationism as a transnational9 symbolic universe and social imaginary—one which 
is apparently used in a rational and secular sense, but which nevertheless has religious 
usages and implications. In discussing the dimensions of innovationism as a 
worldview,10 I wish to elucidate how innovationism works, first of all, in organizing 
and maintaining core values, and secondly, in managing hope and threat in those post-
secular societies in which religion is a matter of choice.  
 The renowned “theologian of hope,” Paul Tillich, defines religion as being 
about the ultimate concerns of humankind. Thus, religion provides in the first place a 
meaningful  set  of  ultimate  values  on  which  the  morality  of  a  society  can  be  based.  
When these values are institutionalized, they can be spoken of as central values of a 
society.11 Secondly, religion provides an adequate explanation for the “ultimate 
frustrations” which are inherent to the human situation, and which are not manageable 
or morally meaningful. Death is the type case of (individual) ultimate frustrations, 
while environmental concerns and climate change are current issues that appear to 
threaten the whole of humankind.  
Ultimate values should be greater than ultimate frustrations, and religion 
should provide an adequate explanation for ultimate frustrations, so that the individual 
or the group can accept them without having their core values rendered meaningless.12 
In a similar way, Tillich emphasizes the necessity of hope for human beings and for 
the collective: hope should exist as the driving force for a human being “as long as he 
lives.”13 
 In religious studies, Tillich’s view on ultimate concerns has for some time 
been considered “rather empty and too wide-ranging” to facilitate an understanding of 
religions. Ninian Smart advocates a comparative perspective, with the study of 
“dimensions of worldviews.” According to Smart, there are seven dimensions that 
need to be taken into account: (1) the ritual or practical, (2) the philosophical, (3) the 
mythic or narrative,  (4) the experiential  or emotional,  (5) the ethical  or legal,  (6) the 
organizational or social, and (7) the material or artistic dimension.14 
 In understanding innovationism as a belief system or worldview, it appears 
that the approaches of Tillich and Smart may complement each other. Innovationism 
is strongly based on certain shared values. The circulation of these values not only 
contributes to the construction of an imagined (global) community,15 but  is  also  the  
basis on which the more practical dimensions are constructed.  
 Thus, the tentative conclusion would be that innovationism provides for 
contemporary developed societies both a set of ultimate values and a way of 
controlling the ultimate frustrations. In this way innovationism can be perceived of as 
religious. The set of values is institutionalized through the constant circulation of 
innovationism in different contexts and conjunctures.  
 In what follows, I will first explore innovationism as it appears in my 
empirical material from the point of view of ultimate values at the individual, 
corporate, national, and global levels, and in relation to dimensions of worldviews. 
Secondly, I will discuss the ultimate frustrations and how innovationism appears to 
manage them in its various dimensions. Thirdly, I will study the actors taking part in 
the institutionalization of innovationism, as demonstrated in the interviews. Finally, I 
will discuss the mechanisms of innovationism that contribute to the contemporary, 
collective search for meaning and the quest for certainty. 
 Before that, however, it will be necessary to take a look at the definitions and 
usages of the concept of innovation; these can also be analyzed through the doctrinal 
dimension of innovationism.16 
Innovation 
 The current use of the word innovation is generally acknowledged to have 
derived from the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter. His perception of innovation can 
be summed up in the following four themes: 
1. Innovations are changes in production functions which cannot be 
decomposed into infinitesimal steps. In other words, innovation involves 
putting productive resources to uses which have hitherto been untried in 
practice.  At  the  same  time,  resources  are  withdrawn  from  the  uses  that  they  
have served so far.18 
2. Innovation should be distinguished from invention or experimentation. It is 
not invention that matters, but the adoption and actual working of something. 
In themselves, inventions do not exert any influence on business life at all. In 
other words: “Innovation, unless it consists in producing, and forcing upon the 
public a new commodity, means producing at a smaller cost per unit, breaking 
off  the  old  supply  schedule  and  starting  a  new  one.  It  is  quite  immaterial  
whether this is done by making use of a new invention or not.”19 
3. Innovations appear in clusters at certain times because “as soon as the 
various kinds of social resistance to something that is fundamentally new and 
untried have been overcome, it is much easier not only to do the same thing 
again but also to do similar things in different directions, so that a first success 
will always produce a cluster (e.g., the emergence of the motorcar 
industry).”20  
4. In competitive capitalism innovations are the mechanism which creates 
disturbance, mainly through the foundation of new firms. In the short term, 
innovations require large investments and “supernormal energy and courage.” 
In the long term they will—in successful cases—produce progress and 
profit.21 
In the empirical material comprising the interviews with journalists and innovation 
system specialists in Japan, Finland, and the United States, the interviewees produce 
various explanations when asked to define the concept of “innovation.” However, it is 
apparent that the Schumpeterian definition is to a large extent internalized and 
adopted as a doctrinal starting point, since most emphasized that innovation is more 
than just a new thing. For the interviewees, innovation means a new invention or 
product which can be, or has already been commercialized and which brings in 
money to a company or individual who is in possession of the innovation. However, 
although the fourth characteristic of innovations as creating disturbance is often 
stated, and might even be referred to directly as “creative destruction,” the point that 
innovations require risk-taking and a lot of time in order for a profit to be gained is 
often discarded.  
 Furthermore, the usage of the word innovation (or of the term translated in this 
way) varies greatly in different languages. For instance, in Japanese there is strong 
emphasis  on  new  technology  and  gadgets.  Interviewees  also  use  notions  such  as  
“service innovation” and “social innovation,” which further blurs the picture. Service 
innovations and social innovations can be made by public actors as well as private 
companies, and no cash flow is necessary. The uncertainty in the term has been 
resolved by some interviewees by referring to the concept of “surplus value.” Thus, 
innovations would be “new commercialized inventions that bring surplus value to the 
users and the producer.” In practice, during the interviews the word is used in ways 
that have a very vague connection with the definitions given by the interviewees at 
the start of each interview. This demonstrates the doctrinal aspect of the concept: the 
word innovation is  used  in  such  a  wide  range  of  contexts  that  its  implications  are  
supposed to be known to all. 
 Thus, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction between talk about 
specific cases of innovation and individual innovations (the technical dimension), talk 
about the innovation system and the innovation environment (the social dimension), 
and the wider discursive web of conjunctures where national competitiveness in fear-
provoking global circumstances appears to require innovation as a means for national 
survival (a blend of the ritual, mythical, and doctrinal dimensions). In the interviews 
these distinctions are often blurred and talked of simultaneously. 
The Value System of Innovationism 
 Myths can be defined as authoritative stories belonging to certain groups or 
traditions. Myths are recited in the community, and these kinds of stories are 
foundational  for  the  group  in  question.  The  shared  values  of  the  community  are  
narrated in circulated and repeated mythic tales. This practice is linked to the mythic, 
or narrative dimension of a worldview.22 
 The narrative dimension appears in the definitions of innovations used by the 
interviewees.  By  analyzing  this  dimension  it  is  possible  to  begin  to  draft  the  set  of  
ultimate values on which innovationism relies, and to describe how the values appear 
in the interviews.23 Here, values are perceived as aims, as aspirations toward which 
the actors strive. In the narratives which circulate in the interviews the core values cut 
across individual, corporate, national, and global levels; moreover, to a certain extent 
all of the values are present on all the levels, and thus they create a whole circulatory 
system of innovationism. However, it appears that certain values pertain to particular 
levels more than others.  
 Based on the interviews, the following values would appear to lie at the core: 
success, growth, competiveness, and progress. These values appear in stories that 
recur within the interviews.  
 The values appear on four levels within the narratives: firstly, at the individual 
level, innovation becomes a means for success for the interviewees, in the United 
States in particular. The myth of the American dream of the individual entrepreneur is 
frequently repeated in the U.S. interviews. The success of individual entrepreneurs 
can also involve new start-up companies, which can generate growth. At the 
individual  level,  the  narrative  dimension  seems to  have  a  particular  connection  with  
the ethical dimension. The innovation system specialists emphasized how the 
behavior of individuals should become suitable for creating innovations: more 
mobility, flexibility, creativity, language proficiency, and openness, plus a risk-taking 
mentality, are qualities required of the citizens of an innovative nation. 
 At the corporate level, innovation first and foremost provides a means for 
productivity and the possibility for growth. Innovations can also mark the beginnings 
of new corporations, which is one of the aspirations of competing nations: to get more 
start-up companies. It is at the corporate level that the material dimension of 
innovationism appears most visibly: enterprises create new technology, new services, 
and new markets though innovations.  
 The competitiveness of the nation-state is the third value appearing in the 
interviews.  
 The  global  setting  in  which  nation-states  compete  with  each  other  is  a  myth  
that is hardly ever questioned. Through innovativeness, the basic starting point of 
economic competition is widened to include competition in general. National 
competitiveness is then more than economic; it is about being useful for the global 
community, becoming visible and important—being meaningful—for others in the 
global setting. 
 At the national level, innovationism is also a part of the political discourse on 
national competitiveness, a discourse that was introduced during the 1980s throughout 
the industrialized world. In the narrative of innovationism, the globalizing economy 
poses a threat to nation-states.24 Thus, national actors became worried about their 
survival and success. At the same time, Schumpeterian technology-driven ideas on 
innovation became influential in economics. It is important to note that although the 
discourse on competitiveness is a global one, the consequences and actions are taken 
at a national level. Thus, competiveness becomes an aim primarily at the national 
level, although it is a value also at the corporate level. 
 Fourthly and finally, at the global level, the narrative of innovationism appears 
in the emphasis on progress. This could be considered the philosophical level of 
innovationism. The reliance on constant progress remains even when, occasionally, 
growth is questioned. Innovations then become a means for the further enhancement 
of humankind, providing hope during times of global environmental threat. The 
values of progress and competitiveness are constantly intertwined when the national 
and the global circulate in the interviews: 
 […] in Asia relations between Japan, China, and Korea are complicated and 
difficult. We have been competing for hundreds of years. During the last 
twenty years Japan has been the underdog and has suffered severe mental 
[spiritual] damage. Should we progress [purely] with style or charm? With the 
arts? [referring to the Cool Japan phenomenon and the global growth of sales 
in Japanese popular culture] Our citizens are wondering about this as well. 
That  is  why  we  compete  in  science  and  want  to  compete  for  who  is  best  in  
developing solutions for the [environmental] threats facing humanity. Our 
current prime minister has set a target to cut down carbon dioxide emissions 
by 25 per cent. This is a truly idealistic goal, and a significant one. It is 
something China and Korea cannot do. We no longer compete in food, 
fashion, or cars, but we want to be a presence and to be important in the world 
in other ways. We are looking for these ways now.25  
 
This excerpt from the interview with a Japanese journalist also exemplifies the fear of 
failure in reaching what is aimed at. A nation that fails in competition will be 
damaged and will need to seek out new areas in which to become competitive. The 
possibility of innovation brings determination and hope: “We will be meaningful in 
the world of tomorrow.”  
Affective Resonance: Threat and Hope 
 “The emphasis in religion is today on this world, not the world to come,” 
writes Liselotte Frisk in her discussion of Linda Woodhead’s concept, the “turn to 
life.” The turn to life refers to the focus on gaining desirable results in this world, in 
other words in the immanent frame. According to Woodhead, themes of punishment, 
hell, damnation, and demonology have been losing their importance as societies have 
become more “this-worldly.”26 Innovationism can be seen as following this trend in 
its focus on human capabilities and abilities. However, innovationism can also be 
seen as narrating something of a substitute for “hell,” in foreseeing the failure of 
humankind to solve global threats, of which global warming is the most threatening. 
 At every level, the management of threat and hope in innovationism can be 
analyzed through the emotional dimension: innovationism creates a sense of threat by 
narrating the ultimate frustrations and also attempts to manage these threats through 
positing innovations as solutions to the threats it narrates—thus giving hope for the 
future.  
 The ultimate frustrations appear in the interviews in expressions of a sense of 
threat  and  fear.  The  sense  of  threat  is  concentrated  within  issues  of  global  warming 
and environmental change, phenomena that intensify an awareness of the limitedness 
of natural resources. To some extent, the talk about the environment and 
demographics is invited by the framework of the interviews, in which innovations are 
discussed in the context of global warming and aging. Nevertheless, the interviewees 
frequently list threats and challenges which correspond to multiple features of the risk 
society.27 The world is dangerous at every level: the global level, the national level, 
the level of (the media) industry, and at the individual level. Exacerbated by the 
global economic recession and the development of an aging society (in Japan in 
particular)  the  ultimate  frustrations  are  concentrated  into  the  issue  of  sustaining  the  
nation. However, at the core of global threats is the competition.  
 In The Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault points out that within 
neoliberalism, it is not the market mechanism that is new. What is new is the idea of 
constant competition and the aim of continuous growth.28 At this point, taking up 
Foucault’s identification of competition as the novel feature, I wish to set out one of 
my central claims: that through innovationism, competition is transformed into the 
central generator of the sense of threat. The operational environment of nation-states 
and corporations is one of constant competition for resources, for “top” workers, and 
for foreign investment. And similarly, individuals compete against each other: for 
jobs, for visibility, for fame.  
 The outcome of possible failure was hardly ever explicated in the interviews, 
but it can be read between the lines. In fact, the ultimate frustrations derivable from 
the interviews involve death, waning, chaos, and extinction.  
 The following table (Table 1) illustrates how innovationism manages hope and 
threat at different levels in relation to the ultimate values. The table also lists the most 
relevant corresponding dimensions for each level. It should, however, be noted that all 
the  dimensions  and  values  cut  across  all  the  levels.  In  fact,  two  other  levels,  the 
narrative and the emotional level permeate all the levels and values to such a degree 
that it would be unreasonable to mark them in the table. 
 
Table 1 
How Innovationism Manages Hope and Threat at Different Levels 
Level Value (Aim) Hope 
Outcome of 
Failure Threat Dimension 
Individual Success Memory Unemployment Death Ethical 
Corporate Growth Expansion Takeover Merger or 
bankruptcy 
Material  
National Competiveness Sustaining the 
nation 
Competitive 
ineptness 
Waning, 
oblivion 
Social/ritual 
Global Progress Continuity Climate change Chaos, 
extinction 
Philosophical 
 
In the manner of a religion, innovationism offers a way to counter ultimate 
frustrations.  The  sense  of  threat  is  used  to  create  an  affective  resonance29 for 
particular institutional demands, and as a justification for political practices and 
funding decisions. The interviewees repeated the Porterian30 thesis, that in order to 
survive and prosper amid global competition, the nation has to have a high level of 
competitiveness.31 
 In the definitions of innovation proposed by Schumpeter (see above), 
innovation is a means to create growth and productivity and thus competitiveness. 
However, in innovationism, innovations are loaded with much more significance. 
Innovations and innovativeness become the aim itself, and the creation of a good 
environment for innovation becomes the goal of nations. Because of the threat of 
losing out in competition, the focus is shifted onto innovations as an apparent means 
of controlling uncontrollable circumstances. In this way innovations emerge not only 
as  an  instrument  of  hope,  but  also  as  a  chance  to  shift  the  focus  away  from  the  
looming threat of competition and onto innovations per se. 
The Power and Social Dimension of Innovationism 
 I shall now move to the organizational and social dimensions of 
innovationism, focusing on the actors and roles present in the production and 
circulation of innovationism. 
 The most important actors in the circulation of innovationism are the national 
elites. Among the interviewees there are innovation systems specialists and 
journalists,  both  of  whom  can  be  regarded  as  the  elites  of  innovationism.  Some  
members of the elite play advocational roles such as “preachers,” gurus, theologians, 
and prophets. Others take more neutral or even skeptical roles. For “ordinary people” 
the interviewees provide two possible role positions: they are either the audience, 
which should be educated or informed, or those who have the potential for creating 
innovations that the system is not yet able to tap into. I shall return to these actors and 
roles after considering the national frame of innovationism. 
 Benedict Anderson uses the concept of imagined communities in discussing 
the development of nationalism. For him, the imagined community is the nation. 
Many others take a similar view, arguing that the nation holds the position in society 
that religion used to occupy before the development of modernization.32  
 Anderson sees the nation as the idea upon which communities can create a 
secular transformation, from fatality into continuity, and contingency into meaning. 
“With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed did 
not disappear- Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more arbitrary. 
Absurdity of salvation: nothing makes another style of continuity more necessary.”33 
 For  Charles  Taylor,  imagined  communities  are  a  particular  kind  of  social  
imaginary, socially shared in ways in which social spaces are imagined.34 An essential 
part in the conjuncture of global competition is the reproduction of a social imaginary 
in which the imagined communities perceived as nations take part. Innovationism can 
be  seen  as  a  complementary  element  in  sustaining  the  imaginary  community  of  the  
nation within this conjuncture. The imaginary structure of the world in innovationism 
is based on two contradictory logics: on the one hand, there is the conforming, global 
logic of innovations and the emphasis on the global setting, including the idea of the 
global,  imagined  center  of  Silicon  Valley.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  strong  
emphasis on the nation-state, which in fact has the role of a mediator in the circulation 
of ideas. (Trans)national elites circulate innovationism to the national level, while 
doing this they apply the national framework and make use of the imagined 
community within the nation. The nation and the national political system is the frame 
within which resources are distributed, and elites with symbolic power themselves 
possess an interest in this distribution. The affective nature of these processes is 
significant. The power struggle is conjunctured with questions of national survival 
and a sense of threat and hope.  
 The imagined center of Silicon Valley appears in the interviews as the 
“center” but also as the “peak” of innovativeness. Smart describes the various ways in 
which height has symbolic value in most cultures and notes how height, size, and 
centrality are often connected.35 Interviewees, not only in Japan and Finland, but also 
on the East Coast of the United States refer to the Silicon Valley, not just as a source 
of innovative new solutions, but also as an ideal innovation environment: a place with 
a highly competitive atmosphere, plus a creative buzz—both desired characteristics. 
In Silicon Valley one sees a reversal of the norm: interviewees emphasize that there is 
no need to travel to see the world, since “everybody comes here.” This mentality can 
be understood through social practices belonging to the ritual dimension. One of these 
is pilgrimage. Groups and individuals traveling to the Silicon Valley and to Stanford 
University to learn innovativeness can be seen as pilgrims traveling to the center of 
innovationism. In pilgrimage, travellers go to “high sacral bumps in space, learn and 
gain from its merit, and convey it back to the periphery.”36 Within the periphery there 
is  a  desire  to  become like  the  center,  or  at  least  to  overcome the  spatial  and  mental  
distance between the center and the periphery. 
 The strength of the imagined center is underlined in the interviews with the 
Japanese and Finnish elite experts, who are almost in despair over a national lack of 
innovativeness, mobility, or openness, and express the desire to reach the level of 
innovation in Silicon Valley. The sense of inadequacy cannot be assuaged by 
international comparisons that emphasize the innovativeness of Japan or Finland.37 
Nevertheless, journalists, who act as mediators between the elites and ordinary 
citizens, are not as certain of the circumstances: In Finland politicians appear to have 
taken on this [idea of developing innovations]. [They are] creating—I’m not sure if it 
is an illusion—but at least I have a perception of Finland being innovative.38 
 The framework of national competitiveness leads the Japanese and Finnish 
interviewees into circulating the idea that there needs to be a national solution—an 
innovation system or innovation environment—that will help in reaching the level of 
Silicon Valley. The irony is that in Silicon Valley itself the interviewees emphasize 
the anarchic and unstructured nature of the innovation environment as being the 
source of its innovativeness.39 Nevertheless, in Finland and Japan the interviewees 
perceive the orientation first and foremost as a national one: innovations are a means 
to maintain (national) competitiveness and to help in solving problems on a (national 
and) global scale. In the United States in general, but particularly in Silicon Valley, 
interviewees focus more on innovations as means for the success of the individual.  
 Within  the  interviews  the  nation-states  become  actors  in  a  literal  sense.  The  
global  community  is  a  stage  on  which  the  nation-state  wishes  to  play  a  major  role.  
Nation-states compete to achieve these roles and hope to become visible on the stage. 
Nation-states also worry about being overtaken by new actors with superior 
competitiveness and more innovative ability:  
Well,  I  think  that  in  general  world  powers  are  shifting.  And  the  rise  of  the  
BRIC40 countries  and  other  places  outside  of  the  United  States  as  powerful  
centres of business with much potential for growth has shifted some of our 
entrepreneurial energy to places like India, China and Brazil, I mean, certainly 
I would say, I myself have done a bunch of reporting in India around telecom 
and have been amazed, blown away by the entrepreneurial spirit and the good 
ideas that are coming out of India and migrating to the US when in fact always 
in decades before you would see innovation go the other way. Ideas would rise 
up in the US and they would migrate to India. Now I think you are seeing it 
happen [the other way around].41 
 
The  national  narrative  in  the  United  States,  as  illustrated  in  this  citation,  is  centered  
around the supposed essentially innovative nature of the United States. The United 
States is perceived as having “always” been the source of innovations, as compared to 
China, India, or Brazil, but now the roles are reversing for the first time. The nation-
state as the leading actor is now under threat of being replaced by younger and more 
flexible players. Important here is the portrayal of a sense of threat within the 
imagined order of nations. (The obvious historical distortedness of the perceptions is 
of less importance.)  
 I shall now return to the individual actors and role positions in the circulation 
of innovationism. As noted above, it is possible to make a division between elites and 
ordinary  people.  The  difference  between  these  groups  is  in  their  access  to  
transnational sources of information and opportunities to take part in the circulation of 
information—in other words, the differences lie at the level of symbolic power that 
they possess.42  
 The actors exercise “pastoral power” through the “effects of words.” Foucault 
emphasizes that power of the pastoral type has spread from religious institutions and 
has entered the entire social body. The aim of pastoral power, as Foucault sees it, is to 
take part in “the development of knowledge of man,” both in a globalizing frame and 
in relation to the individual.43 
 In his discussion of pastoral power, Foucault refers to “the power exercised by 
private  ventures,  welfare  societies,  benefactors,  and  […]  philanthropists.”44 In  a  
similar manner, innovationism has figures who exercise pastoral power while taking a 
variety  of  roles  within  innovationism.  As  manifested  in  the  interviews,  some  of  the  
pastoral figures are academics, consultants, some work for think tanks, and others for 
multinational corporations. Usually they are not politicians, though they may have 
had a political career previously. At the present time they tend to be in a managerial 
position in relation to politics.45 Their  role  can  be  one  of  a  preacher  or  sometimes  a  
theologian,  who  “formulates  the  doctrines  or  teachings  of  a  tradition  or  sub-
tradition.”46 The role of the theologian often appears to be played by the consultants.  
 Some of the pastoral figures act as prophets who describe what a future with 
better innovations will be like. Alternatively, they may issue predictions of a terrible 
future if national systems are not developed into a functioning innovation system/if 
new technology is not commercialized effectively/if the social media are not made 
use of innovatively, and so on. As often as not they are speakers at seminars or 
workshops and called “Social Media Gurus.” There are even people with the title of 
“evangelist” working in technology parks, aiming to achieve “innovation 
development” or “innovation transfer.”  
 These pastoral figures constitute the authorities of innovationism; they are the 
ones who describe the kinds of measures to be taken in order to enhance national 
innovativeness and to develop the national innovation system. In the case of Finland, 
these figures include Pekka Himanen, who during the 1990s47 was the youngest 
scholar ever to defend a dissertation in philosophy, and Jorma Ollila, the former CEO 
of Nokia. The younger generation of these preachers may well be self-made 
entrepreneurs who have made fortunes through ICT-related innovations. Pastoral 
power is also exercised by the directors and employees of national funding 
apparatuses, such as Tekes in Finland or JST in Japan. Consultants and researchers 
working in think tanks and universities can also fall into this category. 
 The people mentioned above appear frequently in the media, where they 
describe and define how the innovation system should be organized in order to 
maximize the production of innovations. Indeed, some of the people in this category 
were interviewees for this study. An equally important function of these figures is to 
“preach” at seminars, symposiums, and workshops; these are the arenas in which they 
spread enthusiasm, propagate innovationism as a faith, and emphasize the relevance 
of related values to officials, decision makers, journalists, academics, and 
entrepreneurs. They are, as it were, performing in such a way as to generate affective 
resonance, so that institutional structures and funding decisions may be legitimized.  
 The actors taking part in the circulation of innovationism are predominantly 
male, and so too (almost exclusively) are the pastoral figures appearing in the media. 
The overall picture is one of men predominating in discussions concerning 
innovations, innovation policies, and the measures that need to be taken. Overtly, the 
world  of  innovations  is  gender  neutral,  and  it  is  true  that  women  are  not  explicitly  
excluded, however, they are not actively included either. In practice, this means that 
the women who are actually visible in this field are exceptions.48 The  point  here  is  
that in both Finland and in Japan, innovation discourse exists as part of a continuum 
of science and technology policy discourses, and that women have been sidelined for 
decades in national discourses related to technological development.49 Similar 
restrictions apply in discourses related to a number of areas of technology—ICT in 
particular.50 
 The belief that innovations can raise a nation’s competitiveness is obviously 
strongest among specialists in innovation systems. These interviewees emerge not 
only as “believers” but also as “theologians,” or as the kinds of “preachers” 
mentioned above. For these people, innovations are self-evidently phenomena to be 
supported. The repeated argument is that we need methods to develop more 
innovativeness: the innovation system or innovation environment should be made 
more fertile so that innovations can increase.51 The comparisons with the Silicon 
Valley ideal are frequent and admiring. The people in question see many kinds of 
problems in the innovation system, in the national mentality, in the general mood of 
the times, and in the attitude of the “ordinary people.” Criticism is also directed at the 
quality of scientists and journalists.52 
 The symbolic, pastoral power that is represented and reproduced by elites 
through the circulation of innovationism is connected to economic and political 
power. Symbolic power in general differs from other forms of power in the sense that 
it  affects  “not  just  what  we  do,  but  our  ability  to  describe the social itself; it affects 
the perception of the inequalities in the social world, including the unequal 
distribution of those very symbolic resources themselves.”53 
 The elite interviewees saw society first and foremost as an environment for 
innovation—one whose purpose is to provide good circumstances for more innovative 
activities and competitiveness. The question is predominantly one of flows of public 
funding. Innovationism has meant that the flood of public money to the private sector 
has been plentiful and rapid. Among other things, it has meant that health care 
institutions, schools, and universities are seen as deserving of investment, insofar as 
they are basic elements of the innovation environment.  
 One of the contradictions of innovationism lies in the relationship between the 
transnational and the nation. The processes to which innovationism is attached—
namely, the free flow of capital, economic growth, and competition—are 
transnational, and could in fact lead to the dissolution and erosion of the nation-state. 
However,  the  particular  actors  and  elites  with  symbolic  power  in  the  circulation  of  
innovationism are always national, although they have access to the transnational 
mechanisms by which innovationism is circulated. Consequently, national elites, 
while preaching innovationism within the nation, in fact use their symbolic power in a 
contradictory manner, to advance the globalizing processes that are tightly bound up 
with their faith in innovation. The nation-state is a necessary vehicle for globalization. 
And at the same time, global trends constitute the vehicle through which the elites 
attempt to sustain their power. This happens through twin endeavors—the summoning 
up of threatening images of globalization and the preaching of innovationism. 
The Consecrating Role of the Journalist and Journalism 
 Pierre Bourdieu describes the way in which the art-businessman has the power 
to consecrate works of art and to create value for works and artists.54 In a similar way, 
journalists have symbolic power in the process of consecrating individual innovations, 
and in the recycling and reproduction of innovationism. This consecrating role is 
recognized both by specialists and by journalists themselves, but the perspectives of 
the parties are different. The pastoral specialists would like to have journalists employ 
their consecrating power and take part in the national project of supporting 
innovations. The specialists see the role of journalism and the media as focal in 
creating a more innovation-friendly mental environment within society. “It is the 
media through which we construct the world of technology and innovations,” was 
how one of the Finnish specialists put it.55 But (as indicated above) it is clear that 
journalists, too, recognize the potential influence of journalism56:  
The Japanese in general have a relative mentality; they watch people or 
society and then adopt their standpoints, judging what to do. This is a national 
feature, because Japan is so closed. In that sense, the media in Japan play a 
more important role than in other countries. I think that it is not bad to be 
balanced in writing, but sometimes I think that the established media prioritise 
consensus.57 
 
Within the interviews, “ordinary journalists” might repeat slogans on innovation that 
are similar to those used by specialists. However, it is less likely that journalists will 
be able to explain the entire structure of the innovation system. It was notable that 
those interviewees who had a deeper knowledge of the innovation environment 
seemed also to be more committed to innovationism. Generally, specialists would like 
journalists to take on a “consecrating” role. The journalists in the interviews were, in 
some cases, explicit in resisting such wishes. Thus, there were interviewees who 
subscribed to the idea of global competition and who believed in innovations, but who 
were nevertheless opposed to the position offered to them by “the state”—a position 
equivalent to the national, official stance toward innovations: 
<Extract>These days you very seldom encounter this thing that journalists are 
supposed to commit themselves to promoting good things. And here, 
suddenly, they’ve dug this idea out of its grave, I feel, that we all have a 
shared agenda here. This idea that we’ve been sent to Stanford and it’s 
assumed that we understand that this is important, important for the future of 
the nation. […] The way those in the top echelon of society talk about 
innovation as a subject […] they have this idea of the survival of the nation. 
And then,  it  seems so  easy  to  extend  [the  idea  to  journalism]  and  to  say  that  
journalism should commit itself to this objective, too. But [we] should just be 
able to separate [ourselves] from this. [The task of journalism then] is to put 
these matters on the agenda […] to that extent we have a common project. 
After that, journalism and journalists should continue in an independent and 
self-contained manner.58 
 
Even though interviewees might be critical of the demands placed on them to further 
the innovation system and promote innovations, they nevertheless do believe that 
innovations are good and necessary: innovations can help to solve social problems 
and contribute to economic growth; they can also help the nation to gain and 
or/maintain its status among other nations.59 
Looking for Security in a Dangerous World 
 In  this  section,  I  shall  describe  how  questions  of  collective  meaning  (in  the  
sense of meaning in life) were bound up with innovationism in the interviews. For this 
purpose, I shall make a brief detour via John Dewey (1929/1999), who noted that 
human beings living in a dangerous world have to look for safety and certainty. 
According to Dewey, humans have historically done this in two ways: either by trying 
to conciliate the surrounding environmental forces through prayer, rites, and magic, or 
by developing skills to use natural forces for human advantage. The second of these 
methods changes the world through action, while the first changes human thoughts 
and feelings.60  
 In the search for meaning and certainty, innovations combine action and 
feeling in at least three ways. First of all, innovations appear to be the only means for 
survival in the “risk society” and in a world full of threats. Producing more 
innovations provides a way of changing the world through action. Thus, I would 
suggest that within innovationism these two aspects—action and feeling (or affect)—
are merged: innovationism aims at changing human thoughts and feelings concerning 
the world, since it suggests that the world is there first and foremost for utilization. 
 Secondly, innovations provide a way of changing human feelings and thoughts 
related to certain looming threats. Innovations give hope for a better future at the 
national level (we can become visible on the global stage) and at the individual level 
(what I do can have meaning, and I can become rich).  
 Thirdly, innovationism has an exhilarating aspect, containing within it 
enthusiasm for creating a better future. Innovations appear to achieve something more 
than reliance on economic growth; they contain the possibility for a nation to become 
visible on the global stage even when it is about to shift involuntarily into an era of 
degrowth because of an aging population. By being innovative as a nation, the 
country (Japan) can become a notable model for other nations in demonstrating 
controllable degrowth.  
 “There is a limit to which economic growth can answer the question of the 
meaning of life. We are like the sorcerer’s apprentice: What we have unleashed is out 
of control. Nowhere is this more true than in Japan.”61 An interviewee puts this in 
other words: 
 […] Our success at present is based on economic success. However, the 
natural resources, such as oil, which made that success possible, will run out 
sooner or later, and we can’t think of the economy alone. The five billion 
people in the world suddenly have to face difficulties. I think we have to make 
efforts to solve the problems. Since there is no way we can get out of this 
reality, we should try to think how to mitigate the damage or how to alleviate 
it. We need to find a balance and find a way to downgrade our standards of 
living. From that perspective, the decrease in the population of Japan might 
not  be  so  bad  after  all.  […]  But  we  need  to  maintain  some  basic  level  of  
economy. We need bread first, and we can’t let the economy come crashing 
down. The downgrading should be controlled, and we need overall planning 
for that. In Japan the population is decreasing. When this development 
becomes  visible,  and  if  we  can  manage  the  downgrading  here,  we  can  give  
examples to other countries as well.62 
 
By these means, through innovations, nations can prove that they are original and 
authentic. This includes being useful for the global community and for humanity, 
amid the worrisome, threatening issues of global warming and aging. Some of the 
interviewees believed that if innovative thinking became sufficiently advanced, it 
could find ways toward a better future in which economic growth would no longer be 
the necessary framework.  
<Extract>Competition is part of the today’s world, and I think there are two 
parts that we should think of, today and the future. These two often contradict 
each  other.  At  present,  if  we  put  a  higher  priority  on  the  former,  say,  selling  
goods more and ruining natural resources, we will end up ruining the future, 
too. I think we should make rules like in boxing matches; in the course of the 
match, people compete with one another, but keep to certain rules of 
sportsmanship. Of course, politicians can make rules, but they have to think 
mainly about today, in order to survive an election, so ideally, the intelligent 
citizens or NGOs should form groups for discussion. These kinds of ideal 
groups can’t be brought about by the UN, unfortunately. It can’t be the OECD 
or a world economy forum or anything like that. It should be something 
unrelated to the economy, because the point of view of the economy belongs 
to today, not to the future.63 
 
This perception is nevertheless very different from the ideology of what has been 
termed the degrowth movement.  The degrowth movement calls for the dissolving of 
the global financial system and a return to local economies, in which consumption 
and needs would be in balance with natural resources. It criticizes the concept of 
sustainable  development  on  the  grounds  that  it  continues  the  exploitation  of  the  
natural environment by virtue of the ideology of growth. In fact, such critical notions 
in respect of growth and global competition did not appear in the interviews.  
 Innovationism is attractive because it provides a hope for a better collective 
future, and hope for security during times that appear to be full of insecurities. By 
circulating a belief in innovations, late modern societies have created a transnational, 
yet nationally applicable belief system which appears to be rational and intelligible. 
Here we have a way of managing prevailing fears and insecurities—and holding to a 
utopian view of a better future. In line with this, and taking an optimistic view, 
Hautamäki (2010) offers the possibility of “sustainable innovation,” or “creating 
products and services promoting sustainable economic growth without undermining 
quality of life and equilibrium with nature”64—hence a mechanism for creating a 
sense of certainty. Thus, innovationism rises above the mundanities of politics and the 
economy: it becomes a promise that we will find tools not only for economic survival, 
but also for physical survival in an age of environmental dangers. 
To Conclude: A Quest for Certainty in the Immanent Frame 
 If the idea of a God is ruled out, the answer to the issue of the meaning of life 
can be sought from two directions: either by denying the question itself or by saying 
that one of our present purposes already has the fullness or richness that we seek.65 
The  discourse  on  innovations  can  then  be  seen  in  conjunction  with  the  latter.  It  
provides a means of avoiding the underlying, deeper question about a collective and 
individual meaning for life by appearing to provide one. The belief in innovations is 
based on rationality and has no (apparent) connection with divinity, however, it is 
strongly oriented toward the future. There is no doubt that innovationism is a this-
worldly belief system: its focus is on continuous growth through innovations. Yet, 
innovationism also has its utopian side, since it forms a collective way of imagining a 
better future.  
 Socially, innovationism creates a sense of “us,” connected to an imagined 
(global) community, and it offers a chance to contribute to this community, in 
creating solutions for problems that threaten the very existence of that community 
(including, preeminently, global warming). In this worldview, innovations themselves 
build a bridge to a better future and to saving the world.  
 Charles Taylor describes different ways of perceiving secularity. He describes 
how secularity refers to a condition in which “public spaces have been emptied of 
God” and belief in God is declining. Taylor wishes to move further, and to discuss the 
conditions of belief in a society where God is one alternative among others rather than 
unchallenged and unproblematic as was the case in previous centuries.66 
 Berger calls this pluralism. In his article Protestantism and the Quest for 
Certainty, he admits to having made one big mistake in his career: thinking that 
modernity would lead necessarily to the decline of religion. This, of course, has been 
documented as contrary to fact by many others as well.67 The insight that Berger says 
he has had during his career is that modernity leads to pluralism. And in pluralism, 
certainty is hard to find:  
People may still hold the same beliefs and values that were held by their 
predecessors in more uniform situations, but they will hold them in a different 
manner: what before was given through the accident of birth now becomes a 
matter of choice. Pluralism brings on an era of many choices, and by the same 
token, an era of uncertainty.68 
 
This citation can be reflected on from two sides in relation to the empirical findings of 
this study. On the one hand, modernity, undoubtedly, did bring plurality in a certain 
sense. However, considering the strength of the ideology of national competitiveness 
and the belief in the beneficial nature of innovations manifested in the interviews, I 
might provocatively ask whether or not there is any pluralism in these beliefs. Has 
believing in innovations perhaps taken on the position of a “consensus on the nature 
of reality and on the norms by which one should lead one’s life”69—at least in large 
parts of the three societies where the persons interviewed in this study live? (And if 
this is the case, are they living in conditions that can no longer be called modernity?) 
On the other hand, we can interpret a belief in innovations as an attempt to control the 
uncertainty brought on by the conditions of pluralism.  
 Relying on innovations would thus be a “quest for certainty” and a quest for 
knowledge, an effort to transcend belief. As Dewey points out, belief is often assumed 
to  be  a  mode  of  thinking  about  a  realm  of  uncertainty.70 The future, including 
innovations, belongs to the realm of uncertainty, as one of the interviewees agonises: 
“Innovation is fundamentally unpredictable […] it’s hard to put a narrative on a 
process which is fundamentally unpredictable. […] it was just not easy to predict 
beforehand.”71 Thus, relying on uncertain innovations as the way to a seemingly 
certain future becomes a contemporary, mundane version of religion. There is a 
strong parallel here with Noble’s argument about the religion of technology, by which 
human engagement with technology provides a means to regain the (supposedly) lost 
sense of divinity, meaning, and control over the world.72 
 Innovationism is a secular belief in the sense that it does not belong to the 
realm of institutional and historic religions. It can be regarded as belonging more to 
the secular subsystem of the economy, politics, or science.73 Thus, it is not practised 
in the “religious” sphere and is not perceived as religious. Because of this, 
innovationism provides an important case in our understanding of changes in society. 
Post-secularity might thus mean not only more instances of institutional religion in 
the public space, but also understanding and identifying features of belief systems and 
worldviews across what used to be understood as separate subsystems of society. 
 Innovationism is public. Its narratives appear to invoke the rational homo 
economicus. I would argue that this is the particular allure of belief in innovation. It 
appears to belong to the rational, scientific, public sphere: it is collectively acceptable 
to be ecstatic about new gadgets, future prospects, and economic growth. Like any 
ideology, innovationism is invisible and naturalized: the shared faith in it is 
transparent and seems self-evident. There is nothing mystical about innovationism, 
and thus it is more than acceptable to be enthusiastic about innovations, to go on 
pilgrimages to Stanford, to take part in revival meetings where canonized preachers 
profess their faith.  
 In a pluralist society, where life is complicated and values are created by 
individuals themselves, believing in innovations provides an accepted, self-evident, 
future-oriented—and collective—way of imagining a better future.  
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